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Manifestations of psychopathology typically are noted first in the context of a 
person’s everyday life. The inability to work or play, displays of unusual behavior 
or ideation, expressions of subjective distress, and behaviors injurious to self or others 
initially come to the attention of family, friends, co-workers, and other members 
of society. Only subsequently do persons encounter mental health professionals and 
receive psychiatric diagnosis and treatment. In contrast to the wide-ranging mani- 
festations of psychopathology in everyday life, the typical settings for forming 
diagnostic judgments, such as the interview room or the psychiatric ward, provide 
more restricted contexts that limit the range of behaviors likely to be displayed and 
observed. An important goal of clinical assessment, therefore, should be to preserve 
the links between psychiatric diagnostic classifications and the psychopathology of 
everyday conduct. 
The act frequency approach to personality (Buss & Craik, 1980, 1981, 1983a, 
1984, in press; also see Wiggins, 1981) represents a systematic analysis of disposi- 
tional constructs (e.g., dominance, quarrelsomeness) as categories of acts occurring 
in everyday human conduct (e.g., monopolizing the conversation, or picking a fight 
with the stranger at the party). This article outlines the implications of the act fre- 
quency approach for clinical assessment generally, and its application to the per- 
sonality disorders classified in the DSM-III specifically (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1980). 
The first two sections describe the basic framework of the act frequency approach 
and its research and assessment methods. Categories of acts for the dispositions 
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of quarrelsome and submissive illustrate the framework in the context of clinicalIy- 
toned everyday acts. The third section describes the application of the act frequency 
approach to clinical assessment. This agenda includes the analysis of clinically- 
relevant dispositions drawn from the natural language, act prototypicality analysis 
of dispositional constructs relevant to the DSM-III categories, and a detailed act 
prototypicality analysis of alternative approaches to portraying the personality 
disorder syndromes of the DSM-III. The fourth section contrasts the act frequency 
approach with other strategies and orientations such as personality scale assessment 
(e.g., the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory [MMPI]), behavioral assess- 
ment (e.g., Goldfreid & Kent, 1972), and exemplar prototype analysis (e.g., Cantor 
& Genero, in press; Cantor, Smith, French, & Mezzich, 1980). The final section 
draws implications for the clinical assessment of individuals in everyday life con- 
texts and settings. 
THE ACT FREQUENCY APPROACH TO DISPOSITIONAL ANALYSIS 
The act frequency approach begins with the premise that the fundamental goal of 
classificatory systems in personality and clinical psychology is to describe and ac- 
count for regularities in individuals’ actions, broadly conceived, occurring through- 
out the natural flow of everyday conduct (Buss & Craik, 1983c, 1984). Disposi- 
tions are conceptual units that summarize general trends, or act frequencies, in 
conduct. Dispositional constructs guide most personality research, and compose 
subunits of the broader personality disorder syndromes described in the DSM-III. 
To say that Hurry is hostile, from the act frequency perspective, means that he 
has displayed a high frequency of hostile acts over a designated period of observa- 
tion. Dispositional concepts such as hostile capture descriptive regularities in everyday 
conduct. Saying that Harry is hostile, however, does not explain why he picked a 
fight with the stranger at the party, slammed the door when he left the room, made 
belittling comments about the people who walked by, or hit someone who annoyed 
him. In this sense, the act frequency approach shares with the DSM-III the orienta- 
tion of clearly separating descriptive from explanatory tasks (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1980, p. 7). 
As objects are basic elements of the inanimate world, acts are the basic elements 
of the world of human conduct. The network of dispositional constructs provides 
a fundamental system for categorizing acts by partitioning and granting concep- 
tual order to the everyday flow of conduct. An intriguing feature of dispositional 
constructs is that they subsume individual acts that are often widely dispersed in 
time. In contrast, scriptal units (e.g., the restaurant script) subsume temporally 
contiguous act sequences (cf., Abelson, 1981). In this sense, dispositional constructs, 
as well as syndromes that subsume them, are highly selective, chunking acts that 
are extracted from temporally different points along the behavioral stream. Disposi- 
tions summarize the relative frequency of these temporally dispersed acts. 
Although dispositions, from the act frequency perspective, serve this basic descrip- 
tive function, and therefore do not explain the act trends they summarize, manifested 
act trends subsumed by dispositional constructs are far from powerless or inconse- 
quential. Indeed, dispositional act trends can affect causally how individuals describe 
themselves (self-concept), how they are described by others (attributions and reputa- 
tion), and the significant life outcomes that emerge over time in the person’s fate 
in society. High frequencies of hostile acts can evoke angry act trends from others 
(Buss, 1985a), thereby confirming, for example, a self-concept that involves persecu- 
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tion and grandeur, a reputation as troublesome, and a life-history of repeated firings 
from different jobs. These causal impacts of act trends remain one of the most impor- 
tant domains for programmatic research. 
The act frequency approach shares with lexical approaches (e.g., Allport & 
Odbert, 1936; Cattell, 1946; Goldberg, 1982; Norman, 1963; Wiggins, 1979) the 
assumption that many dispositional constructs are sociocultural products that have 
evolved to capture important performance phenomena. As linguistic products, 
dispositional constructs can be analyzed by their cognitive features, two of which 
are especially relevant. First, dispositional categories are treated as “fuzzy sets” 
(Zadeh, Fu, Tanaka, & Shimura, 1975). That is, category boundaries are not sharp- 
ly demarcated and different categories blend into one another, just as the color red 
blends into orange and purple. Second, not all act members within a given disposi- 
tional category possess equal status within it. Some are more central and others 
more peripheral, just as some red objects are “redder” than others and some birds 
(e.g., robins, sparrows) are more “birdlike” than others (e.g., penguins, turkeys). 
Rosch and her colleagues (Rosch, 1975; Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Rosch, Simp- 
son, & Miller, 1976) have conceptualized the differing cognitive status of category 
members in terms of the notion of prototypicality. Highly prototypical members 
are the clearest cases, the best examples, the instances par excellence of the category. 
Thus, dispositional categories are composed of topographically distinct acts that 
differ in their within-category status from highly central or prototypical to pro- 
gressively more peripheral, until the fuzzy boundaries are reached and adjoining 
categories are entered. 
In sum, the act frequency approach treats dispositional constructs as sociocultural 
emergents that capture important descriptive regularities in everyday conduct (Buss 
& Craik, 1983c, in press). These regularities consist of the relative frequencies with 
which acts within the category are performed by persons during a period of obser- 
vation. Dispositions in this sense are not viewed as causal or explanatory. However, 
the assessed act trends subsumed by them carry considerable potency in affecting 
self-concept, observer attributions, reputation, and significant life outcomes. Anal- 
ysis of the cognitive features of category fuzziness and the prototypicality of category 
members facilitates the precision with which dispositions, and the acts subsumed 
by them, can be analyzed and understood as sociocultural emergents. 
ASSESSMENT METHODS OF ACT FREQUENCY ANALYSIS 
The use of dispositional constructs in the act frequency approach generates a pro- 
gram of research based on their analysis (Buss & Craik, 1984). There are three 
basic components to this personality assessment agenda: (1) identifying the inter- 
nal cognitive structure of dispositions by exploring the acts subsumed by them and 
the status of specific acts with respect to dispositional categories, (2) using the in- 
formation acquired from the cognitive mapping as a basis for charting manifested 
frequencies of acts as they occur in the everyday lives of persons, and (3) assessing 
the impact of acts and act trends on the person’s social and physical environment 
and the life-outcome consequences for the individual. 
Act Nominations 
The first step in this research program entails identifying specific acts that are sub- 
sumed by each dispositional category. Act nominations can occur “on-line” (e.g., 
from direct observation by peers, family members, or clinicians) or retrospective- 
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ly. One instructional set that has been used is: “Think of the three most quarrelsome 
[submissive, calculating, narcissistic, etc.] individuals you know. With these in- 
dividuals in mind, write down five specific acts or behaviors that they have per- 
formed that reflect or exemplify their quarrelsomeness [submissiveness, I.” 
These nomination procedures were designed to retrieve a large number of specific 
acts (100 or more) within each dispositional category. Examples of acts from the 
quarrelsome act category are: I cursed at my parents, I criticized him for failing 
to put his napkin on his lap, I insisted on having the last word in the discussion, 
and I slammed the door when I left the room. 
Pro to typicality Ratings 
For each set of acts generated through nomination procedures, panels of judges 
rate the prototypicality of each act. Instructions for this task were adapted from 
Rosch and Mervis (1975) in the domain of colors: 
Close your eyes and imagine a true red. Now imagine an orangish red . imagine 
a purple red. Although you might still name the orange-red or the purple-red with 
the term red, they are not as good examples of red (as clear cases of what red refers 
to) as the clear “true” red. In short, some reds are redder than others.” 
In this specific study, you are asked to judge how good an example of a category 
various instances of the category are. The category is [quarrelsomeness, submissive- 
ness, etc.]. Below are listed 100 acts. You are to rate how good an example of that 
category each act is on a 7-point scale. A “7” means that you feel the act is a very 
good example of your idea of what _ [quarrelsomeness, etc.] is; a “1” means 
you feel the act fits very poorly with your idea of what _ is (or is not a member 
of that category at all). A “4” means that you feel the act fits moderately well. Use 
other numbers on the 7-point scale to indicate intermediate judgments. 
The purpose of this procedure is to identify the consensual prototypicality judg- 
ment of each act for the disposition in which it was initially nominated. Panels of 
judges show reasonable agreement as indexed by alpha reliability coefficients (Buss 
& Craik, 1983a, 1984). Examples of quarrelsome and submissive acts differing in 
prototypicality are shown in Tables 1 and 2. These acts were in part selected to 
give a flavor of clinically-toned actions in everyday conduct. Giving someone the 
“silent treatment ,” for example, seems prototypical of passive-aggressiveness, while 
accusing others of talking behind one’s back suggests suspiciousness or mild paranoid 
tendencies. This latter act gives support to Wiggins’ (1982) hypothesized mapping 
of DSM-III Paranoid Personality Disorder onto the quarrelsome octant of his cir- 
cumplex structure. 
The submissive acts listed in Table 2 also suggest a clinical tone to these occur- 
rences in everyday conduct. Accepting verbal abuse without defending oneself, 
agreeing that one is wrong even though not, and walking out of a store knowing 
that one has been short-changed seem somewhat masochistic. These illustrations 
tend to support Wiggins’ (1982) pl acement of masochism in the submissive (HI) 
octant of his circumplex model of the interpersonal domain. 
Multiple Dispositional Act Sorting 
Although prototypicality ratings yield simple and direct indices of the differential 
status of acts, they undoubtedly underestimate the complexity of the multiple con- 
structs that may be used to interpret each act. In personality and clinical psychology, 
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TABLE 1. Quarrelsome Acts Differing in Prototypicality 
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Endorsement % ’ Prototypicality2 
Male Female He x She F Quarrelsome Acts 
02 06 6.54 6.59 
02 06 6.43 6.45 
04 04 5.96 5.90 
I picked a fight with the stranger at the party. 
I slapped him when he didn’t agree with me. 
I wrote a hate letter to an old boyfriendigirl- 
friend. 
64 63 5.18 5.14 I made belittling comments about the people 
who walked by. 
58 78 4.82 5.10 I gave him/her the “silent treatment” when I 
was upset. 
29 25 5.14 4.72 I twisted my friend’s words around to make 
his/her comments sound insulting. 
44 67 4.29 4.97 I ended the conversation by stalking out of the 
room. 
07 05 4.75 4.48 I criticized every suggestion that was made at 
the meeting. 
16 18 4.61 4.35 
37 47 3.29 3.45 
I stole food from my roommate. 
I condemned others for over-indulging in food 
and drink. 
09 08 3.39 3.21 I made fun of him for having a runny nose. 
24 41 3.04 3.03 
64 51 2.68 3.17 
78 73 2.75 2.90 
58 78 2.71 2.76 
I turned down my steady on a Saturday night. 
I criticized him for smoking. 
I argued about the presidential candidates. 
I complained about how others were mistreat- 
ing me. 
53 63 2.68 2.72 I exaggerated my personal problems. 
33 37 2.89 2.72 I insisted on doing the driving on the trip. 
‘Endorsement percentages reflect the percentage of this sample of undergraduates (N= 100) who 
reported performing the act at least once. 
‘Protorypicality ratings refer to the mean rating, on a T-point scale, of the centrality of the act to 
the quarrelsome category (N- 29). 
few acts are unambiguously pathognomonic, or invariantly indicative of a single 
disposition or disorder. Some acts may signify more than one dispositional con- 
struct, just as some symptoms may signify more than one diagnostic category. To 
explore this complexity, a multiple dispositional sorting and rating procedure was 
devised (Buss & Craik, 1986). 
Eight hundred act descriptions, previously nominated within eight dispositional 
categories, were typed onto 3” x 5” index cards, with one act per card. Panels of 
judges were asked to sort and rate each act with respect to each of the eight disposi- 
tional categories. The 800 acts were shuffled randomfy for each subject, to disperse 
order effects. Each act was first sorted into the category or categories within which 
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TABLE ‘2. Submissive Acts Differing in Prototypicality 
Endorsement % ’ Prototypicality’ 






































































I agreed that I was wrong, even though I 
wasn’t. 
I smoked marijuana when everyone else did. 
even though I didn’t want to. 
I walked out of the store knowing that I’d been 
short-changed 
I accepted verbal abuse without defending 
myself. 
I made love with my partner when I didn’t 
want to. 
When I stood to speak and the others con- 
tinued talking, I simply sat down. 
I continued to apologize for the minor mistake. 
I drank a lot at the party when the others gave 
me a hard time. 
I listened quietly when my parents said that 
my hair was ugly. 
I was not able to tell my friend that I was 
angry with her. 
At the meeting, I let others monopolize the 
conversation. 
I wept when I couldn’t solve the simple 
problem. 
I said “thank-you” enthusiastically and 
repeatedly when someone did me an insignifi- 
cant favor. 
I avoided direct eye contact when the shop 
clerk spoke to me. 
I did not start a single conversation at the 
party. 
Although my friends thought my partner had 
humiliated me, I date him/her again. 
I blushed when he stared at me. 
I pretended I was ill when declining the invi- 
tation to the party. 
‘Endorsements reflect the percentage of males and females in this sample of undergraduates (N = 100) 
who reported performing the act at least once. 
*Prototypicality ratings refer to the mean ratings, for he and she as actor, of the centrality of the act 
to the submissive category on a 7-point scale (N= 47). 
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it was perceived to belong. Multiple category placement was permitted, and sub- 
jects were encouraged to nominate alternative categories to the eight provided if 
the act was judged to belong in categories other than those provided. Following 
the multiple sorting, each act was rated on its prototypicality for each of the 
categories within which it was placed. 
This multiple sorting procedure has yielded intriguing findings that were not un- 
covered by the more direct prototypicality ratings. Here, we will note only one type 
of finding: cross-dispositions categorization. Initially, our categories of quarrelsome 
and submissive were drawn from the Wiggins circumplex model of interpersonal 
behavior (Wiggins, 1979, 1980). One strong advantage of this model over an 
unstructured list is that it provides predictions about the types of cross-dispositional 
links that are more- and less-likely to occur. Because quarrelsome and submissive 
are orthogonal on the circumplex model, it may be predicted that few acts would 
be cross-dispositionally categorized using these two. In contrast, the introverted 
category fails between quarrelsome and submissive. Therefore, both of our target 
categories would be expected to share some acts with introverted. 
These expectations were largely confirmed. There were no acts that showed strong 
placement (e.g., greater than 25 %) in both the quarrelsome and submissive cate- 
gories. This finding serves to confirm the expectation that these two categories are 
orthogonal to each other in the domain of interpersonal behavior. In contrast, several 
acts showed strong placement in both quarrelsome and introverted, as well as in 
submissive and introverted. The following acts showed strong sorting into both quar- 
relsome and introverted (percentage of judges sorting into the quarrelsome and intro- 
verted categories, respectively, given in parentheses): He (she) refused to be intro- 
duced to his (her) friend’s friends (55, 65); He (she) refused to have sexual relations 
with his (her) partner (40, 35); He (she) refused to share his (her) presents with 
his (her) friends (80, 25); H e s e avoided the salesperson’s offer of assistance (40, ( h ) 
55), and He (she) refused to learn how to drive (55, 35). 
The submissive-introverted conjunction showed an even larger number of cross- 
dispositional sortings: At the meeting, he (she) let the others monopolize the con- 
versation (75, 75); He (she) entered the conversation only when spoken to (50, 85); 
He (she) avoided direct eye contact when the shop clerk spoke to him (her) (50, 
80); He (she) refused to argue for his (her) own beliefs (85, 50); He (she) waited 
for the other person to choose a topic to discuss (90, 60); and seven others. 
Assessing Act Performance 
Within the act frequency approach, the assessment of the dispositions of specific 
individuals is based on monitored act trends over a period of observation. Analysis 
of the internal structure of dispositional constructs follows from the theoretical 
assumption that dispositions function as natural cognitive categories of acts (Buss 
& Craik, 1983a) and guides the identification of acts that will count as prototypical 
instances of the disposition being assessed. The aggregation of manifested acts of 
an individual over a period of observation to yield an act trend index for assess- 
ment purposes follows from the theoretical assumption that dispositional assertions 
are summarizing statements concerning human conduct (Buss & Craik, 1983a). 
With rare exceptions, human judges are the most relevant (and in many cases 
the only) source of data for assessing act performance. Human recorders of acts 
may be the actor (self-report or S-data) or a variety of observers (O-data) such as 
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the spouse, friend, acquaintance, social worker, clinical psychologist, ward staff, 
or psychiatrist. Recordings of observed acts may vary in the time elapsed from in- 
itial act observation, ranging from relatively immediate recording to progressive- 
ly more retrospective recordings (such as an hour, a day, a week, a month, or a 
year later). Practical and conceptual issues involved in recording act performance 
are complex and are currently being explored. These issues include the amount 
of inference about internal motives and intentions needed to describe the act ade- 
quately, the degree of situational specificity and the base-rate of occurrence (Buss, 
1985b). 
ACTS, DISPOSITIONS, AND PERSONALITY DISORDERS: 
APPLICATIONS TO CLINICAL ASSESSMENT 
The act frequency approach to clinical assessment entails challenges not encountered 
by the act frequency analysis of normal personality dispositions. Two additional 
complexities are: (1) the analysis of personality disorder syndromes, which sub- 
sume several subordinate dispositional constructs and may carry content not cap- 
tured by their constituent individual dispositions, and (2) the necessity for using 
expert clinical or psychiatric judgment in the various phases of act nomination, pro- 
totypicality judgment, and act assessment. This section outlines three basic strategies 
provided by the act frequency approach to psychiatric diagnosis, and identifies pro- 
cedures for addressing these issues. 
The first strategy starts with trait-descriptive terms in ordinary language and 
identifies the most clinically-relevant dispositional constructs among them. Many 
clinically relevant dispositions in fact occur in the natural language, suggesting that 
trait-descriptive terms have evolved linguistically to describe aspects of the psycho- 
pathology of everyday conduct. Without adopting any psychiatric classification sys- 
tem now in use, this “naive” act frequency application employs act nominations, 
prototypicality ratings, and act performance assessments of clinically relevant dis- 
positions such as anxious, bizarre, insane, perverted, exploitable, licentious, maca- 
bre, and misogynic. This first strategy possesses the advantage of potential discovery 
of important classes of acts in the psychopathology of everyday conduct. Its drawback 
is the overwhelming task faced by analysis of hundreds of dispositions. 
The second act frequency strategy to clinical assessment starts with an existing 
classification system such as the DSM-III, much as our early work drew from the 
dispositions subsumed by the Wiggins (1979) circumplex model of interpersonal 
behavior. DSM-III descriptions of each disorder include a set of clinically-relevant 
dispositions that provide a starting point for act frequency analysis. For example, 
the paranoid personality disorder is described by the dispositions of suspicious, 
mistrustful, hypervigilant, guarded, secretive, jealous, cold, unemotional, humor- 
less, unsentimental, hypersensitive, devious, scheming, argumentative, tense, criti- 
cal, and litigious. This second strategy provides act nominations, prototypicality 
ratings,, and act performance assessments of each of the subsumed dispositions. 
The third strategy in clinical assessment takes the syndrome concept as the start- 
ing point, and attempts to unpack each syndrome in ways that might not be cap- 
tured by the constituent individual dispositions it subsumes. This procedure includes 
direct act nominations for the syndrome, act nominations for pairs and triads of 
subsumed dispositions for each syndrome, prototypicality analysis of the acts and 
dispositions most relevant to the syndrome, and methods for identifying composite 
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act portraits that best represent each syndrome. Each of these strategies entails some 
steps that call for expert psychodiagnostic judgments (e.g., identifying the most 
salient dispositional constructs for each DSM-III personality disorder syndrome) 
and other steps that enlist a broader range of participants (e.g., nominating acts 
of suspiciousness, vanity, and so on). For the latter stages of the procedures, it would 
be desirable to gather nominations from astute observers of social conduct such as 
journalists, playwrights, and the general public, as well as from clinical psychologists, 
psychiatrists, and social workers. The specific procedures for the three strategies 
are described in greater detail below. 
Strategy 1: Identifying Clhically Relevant Dispositions from the Natural language 
The first act frequency strategy takes as its starting point clinically relevant disposi- 
tional constructs appearing in the natural language. This lexical approach starts 
with the basic assumption that dispositional constructs have evolved in the natural 
language to capture important performance phenomena. As described by Norman 
(1963), “perceptible differences between persons in their characteristic manner of 
behaving or changes over time and situations of single individuals in these regards 
have become codified as a subset of the descriptive predicates of the natural language 
in the course of its development (p. 574).” Features of behavior that have endangered 
self or other persons (Maher, B. A., & Maher, W. B., 1985; Maher, W. B., & Maher, 
B. A., 1975), or that have caused subjective distress to self or others, or that show 
adaptive inflexibility, the tendency to generate self-defeating cycles, or tenuous 
stability under stress (Millon, 1981) have become codified as descriptive predicates 
in the natural language. The natural language provides an important starting point 
for the act frequency analysis of the psychopathology of everyday conduct. 
Two descriptive categories appearing frequently in everyday discourse are “de- 
pressed” and “anxious.” In a pilot study using university students as act nominators, 
examples of acts nominated for the depressed category were: I talked about suicide, 
I moped around all day, I listened to depressing music, I trudged when I walked, 
I called a friend and cried over the phone, I drank alcohol alone, I ate very little, 
and I told others all the bad things that happened to me. Examples of acts nominated 
for the anxious category were: I bit my nails, I could not sleep at night, I could 
not sit quietly, I smoked many cigarettes, I walked around the room shuffling ob- 
jects about, and I wondered aloud what my friends thought of me (Van Metre, 
1983). 
This natural language strategy offers the advantage of exploring important classes 
of everyday clinically relevant acts that may elude existing psychiatric classifica- 
tion systems. Included in Allport and Odbert’s (1936) list of trait descriptive terms 
are, for example: caustic, chameleonic, exploitable, hypersensitive, idolatrous, in- 
articulate, inflammable, insatiable, intolerant, intractable, lachrymose, licentious, 
macabre, masochistic, maudlin, misogynic, and mysterious. These terms refer to 
classes of acts that do not appear to be readily subsumed by the DSM-III personality 
disorders, but may constitute important aspects of the psychopathology of every- 
day conduct. 
Goldberg (1982) has reduced the Allport-Odbert listing of trait-descriptive terms 
from 17,954 to 1,710 more commonly used adjectival terms (e.g., abrupt, absent- 
minded, abusive). Our own theoretical formulation provides criteria for deeming 
certain dispositions as more worthy of research attention than others (Buss & Craik, 
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1985). For the present purposes, however, the pertinent sub-set of this domain could 
be identified by having a panel of expert judges rate the terms on their clinical 
relevance to personality disorders in general. 
Strategy 2: ~denfj~jng C~jnicaliy ~e~eyaof Djs~osjtjons 
Subsumed By Each DSM-Ii1 Personality Disorder 
This strategy of clinical assessment starts with the assumption that the existing DSM- 
III classification system has already identified the most important psychiatric syn- 
dromes. Since each personality disorder on Axis II of the DSM-III contains rich 
trait-descriptive portraits, act frequency analysis can be applied to these syndrome- 
relevant dispositions. For example, the histrionic personality disorder is described 
by the dispositions: exaggerated, self-focused, overreactive, irrational, angry, shal- 
low, egocentric, inconsiderate, self-indulgent, vain, demanding, dependent, and 
helpless. Each of these dispositions can be unpacked by the act frequency methods 
of act nominations and prototypicality judgments. Act performance assessments 
can be monitored by self, family members, and relevant members of the psychiatric 
community. 
An important issue in this application of the act frequency approach to psychiatric 
classification is that the DSM-III formulations also contain features that are not 
described in purely dispositional terms. A central characteristic specified for the 
narcissistic personality disorder, for example, is “entitlement,” which denotes an 
expectation of special favors without assuming reciprocal responsibilities (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1980, p. 317). Among other things, entitlement might in- 
volve surprise and anger that others will not do what is wanted. Even though the 
term “entitlement” is not a trait-descriptive adjective, a sense of entitlement can 
nonetheless be treated as a category of acts and thus as dispositional. However, 
other diagnostic indicators may be more difficult to accommodate directly into 
dispositional terms (e.g., relationships that characteristically alternate between ex- 
tremes of overidealization and devaluation) (A merican Psychiatric Association, 
1980, p. 317). 
This second strategy raises important questions about the links between acts, 
dispositions, and syndromes. Do the dispositional descriptions fully capture each 
syndrome? Can non-dispositional features such as entitlement be meaningfully 
treated as act categories and subjected to prototypicality analysis and performance 
assessment? Are there configural combinations of dispositions that more adequately 
represent each syndrome in ways that are missed by the single-dispositional un- 
packing of personality disorders? The third act frequency strategy provides em- 
pirical procedures for addressing these challenges. 
Strategy 3: Establishing tinks Among Syndromes, Djs~osjfjons, and Acts 
The third strategy provides a set of methods for identifying the links among each 
personality disorder syndrome, the dispositions and non-dispositional terms it sub- 
sumes, and the acts that are prototypical for each of these units.’ The basic pur- 
‘Subsequent to the preparation of this article, initial research along the lines indicated has 
been undertaken by Livesley (1984). In his project, Livesley has secured prototypicality 
judgments from members of the Canadian Psychiatric Association and the American 
Psychiatric Association (total N:862). Each participant rated a list of either trait or behavior 
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pose of this strategy is to identify which dispositions and acts best identify each per- 
sonality disorder syndrome. This process includes methods (1) for designating which 
single dispositions are most central to each syndrome, (2) for bypassing disposi- 
tional analysis by proceeding directly to acts nominated for the syndrome itself, 
(3) for identifying conjoint categories of acts through configuring dispositions into pairs 
and triads, (4) for creating act portraits that best identify each syndrome, and (5) 
for act-based conceptual differentiation among personality syndromes. This sec- 
tion describes these procedures. 
Dispositions Most Relevant to Each Syndrome. The first procedure consists of iden- 
tifying which dispositions best represent each personality syndrome. Thus, among 
those falling under its description, prototypicality judgments are made evaluating 
how central each disposition is to each syndrome. Are “suspicious” and “hyper- 
vigilant,” for example, more central to the paranoid syndrome than the disposi- 
tions “humorless” and “litigious”? This procedure also includes multi-dispositional 
prototypicality ratings vis-a-vis each syndrome. Is the combination of “self-focused, 
.demanding, and dependent” more prototypical of the narcissistic personality disorder 
than the combination “irrational, over-reactive, and angry”? 
Conjoint Dispositional Act Nominations. The notion of syndromes can imply con- 
figurations of dispositions that differ from the sum of the constituent individual 
dispositions. The histrionic personality disorder, for example, may be better rep- 
resented by acts that are simultaneously egocentric, self-dramatizing, and depend- 
ent. High frequencies of acts in each of these categories separately may not depict 
the histrionic personality syndrome as well as acts nominated conjointly for the 
dispositional categories. Therefore, the first step in recognizing syndromes within 
the act frequency approach involves act nominations within conjoint categories of 
dispositions. 
For this purpose, individual dispositions subsumed by each syndrome can be con- 
figured into pairs and triads that represent all possible combinations. Acts nominated 
in this fashion would form the second pool of acts, in addition to the pool of acts 
generated by single-dispositional act nominations. Both sets will be used for subse- 
quent portrait-matching and syndrome identification (see below). 
DSM-III Syndrome Act Nominations. Even conjoint dispositional act nominations, 
however, may not fully or accurately capture the nature of acts denoted and con- 
noted by the personality disorder syndromes. Thus, the third procedure for analysis 
at the syndrome level involves direct act nominations for each of the DSM-III per- 
sonality disorder syndromes. Unlike single and conjoint dispositional act nomi- 
nations, however, syndrome act nominations must employ professionals such 
descriptors regarding prototypicality for one of the 11 personality disorders syndromes. 
The trait and behavior lists were derived from four major texts, including the DSM-III 
manual (American Psychiatric Association, 1980). Although our specification of trait and 
act units differs from those employed in this project, and our research agenda extends more 
broadly, the overall conceptual structures of the two approaches map onto each other very 
closely. The reports on this project will provide important empirical findings, and Livesley’s 
presentation has already been recognized as the outstanding scientific paper at the 1984 
meetings of the Canadian Psychiatric Association at Banff. 
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as clinicians and psychiatrists. These act-syndrome nominations would form the 
third pool of acts, joining single and muIti-dispositions act nominations, for develop- 
ing composite act portraits of each personality syndrome. 
Act Portraits and Syndrome Matching. The central purpose of these procedures is to 
produce act portraits that are accurately representative of each syndrome. These 
procedures for generating acts from single dispositions, from multi-dispositional 
conjunctions, and directly from each syndrome provide three pools of acts from 
which the act portraits of syndromes can be constructed and compared for goodness- 
of-fit with the syndrome. 
Several alternative ways of combining acts into act portraits of a given personality 
disorder syndrome are available for comparative study. For the paranoid personality 
disorder, for example, a single act can be drawn from each of the most salient disposi- 
tional constructs for that syndrome. Thus, an act portrait might be generated by 
drawing a single specific prototypical act from each of the following dispositional 
constructs: argumentative, cold, devious, guarded, humorless, hypervigilant, jeal- 
ous, litigious, mistrusting, secretive, scheming, serious, suspicious, tense, and 
unemotional. In a second method, the elements of the act portraits could be drawn 
from the pool of acts generated by the joint nomination of acts for dyads and triads 
of dispositional constructs. A third approach would employ acts nominated dire& 
for the given personality disorder syndrome, rather than from acts nominated for 
their most salient dispositional constructs. 
Multiple-Act Sortings, Syndrome Overlap, and Diagnostic Differentiation. The sharp- 
ness or fuzziness of psychiatric categories continues to be a major research issue 
(e.g., Cantor & Genero, in press; Millon, 1981). The DSM-III personality disorders 
are not regarded as entirely discrete or orthogonal. Indeed, some dispositional 
descriptions are shared by two or more syndromes. The consistent drawing of at- 
tention to oneself (vain, exhibitionistic), for example, appears in the description 
of both narcissistic and histrionic personality disorders. Therefore, syndrome overlap 
and diagnostic differentiation are two crucial issues in clinical assessment. 
The act frequency approach to the dispositional analysis of everyday conduct 
provides the method of multiple-act sorting to clarify these issues. This procedure 
involves presenting clinicians with the 11 personality syndromes, and requesting 
them to sort each act into the category or categories into which it belongs. Subsequent 
to each sort, judges rate each act on its degree of prototypicality for each of the 
syndromes into which it was sorted. 
This sorting procedure yields several kinds of information. First, it identifies which 
acts belong equally to several syndromes, and are therefore not differentially diag- 
nostic. Second, it identifies the acts that belong to one and only one syndrome, and 
therefore can be used as pathognomonic of the syndrome. Finally, it yields em- 
pirical information about the degree of act overlap between each of the 11 personality 
syndromes. This information provides a basis for examining the relations among 
the 11 personality disorder syndromes. It would also serve to gauge the extent to 
which that structure is similar to, or perhaps overlaps with, the structure of interper- 
sonal dispositions (Widiger & Frances, in press). 
Figure 1 shows a graphic illustration of the three levels of analysis: syndromes, 
dispositions, and acts. Act nominations from a panel (iV= 52) of undergraduates 




















































































































































































































400 David M. Buss and Kenneth H. Craik 
syndrome. The procedures outlined above provide a means for moving from syn- 
dromes to dispositions, from dispositions to acts, and from syndromes directly to 
acts. The prototypicality judgments and portrait matching procedures provide kvays 
to identify the acts most relevant to each clinically-relevant disposition, as well as 
acts most relevant to the syndrome, directly or indirectly. The conjoint categorical 
procedures also provide methods for capturing the conligural aspects of each per- 
sonality syndrome. 
RELATION OF ACT FREQUENCY APPROACH TO OTHER STRATEGIES 
The act frequency approach to the psychopathology of everyday conduct carries 
implications for complementary assessment approaches. This section compares and 
contrasts our approach with personality scale assessment (e.g., MMPI), behavioral 
personality assessment (e.g., Goldfried & Kent, 1972), and the recent prototype 
and exemplar strategies advanced by Cantor and her colleagues (Cantor et al., 1980; 
Cantor & Genero, in press; Genero & Cantor, 1985). 
Relation to Personality Scale Assessment 
Among the most widely used psychological assessment devices for psychiatric 
diagnosis are self-reported inventories such as the MMPI (Hathaway & McKinley, 
1943; Dahlstrom, Welsh, & Dahlstrom, 1972, 1975). Clinical scales were con- 
structed, typically through the method of criterion-keying, and diagnoses made from 
relative elevation of single scales or, more typically, through configural interpretation 
of scale combinations. The understanding of scales and profiles evolved progressively 
through a process formalized as construct validation (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). 
As more and more non-test correlates of each scale accrued, the construct considered 
to be assessed by each scale and scale combination evolved to accommodate the 
observed empirical correlates. In this strategy, the scales and profiles tend to be 
primary, and each associated conceptual formulation expands as an inductive sum- 
mary of external correlates (Buss & Craik, 1983b). 
In contrast, in the act frequency approach to clinical assessment, the “external 
correlates” themselves are taken as the primary focus of assessment. That is, the 
frequencies of everyday acts prototypic of clinically relevant dispositions form the 
most central diagnostic focus. Even in the case of personality scales, monitored act 
trends serve as an important source of validational information (Buss & Craik, 
1983b). 
Relation to Cantor’s Prototype and Exemplar Assessment Strategies 
In a series of papers, Cantor and her colleagues have formulated an approach to 
psychiatric diagnosis that attends closely to recent innovations in the' psychology 
of natural categorization. A basic premise of this approach is that psychiatric 
categories, like natural cognitive categories of objects, are “fuzzy” in two senses. 
First, there is fuzziness within categories that produces some ambiguity in “what 
a target instance is.” Category members thus differ from each other in “goodness 
of fit” to the category. Second, there is fuzziness between adjacent categories that 
introduces difficulties in knowing “what a target category isn’t” (Cantor & Genero, 
in press; Horowitz, Wright, Lowenstein, & Parad, 1981). Category overlap can 
result, for example, from imperfect feature nesting; features central to superordinate 
categories (e.g., fruit) may not be invariably characteristic of subordinate categories 
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(e.g., tomato). Category fuzziness in both senses renders clear and unambiguous 
criteria1 assignment of instances to categories difficult. 
Two approaches to natural categorization that analyze within-category fuzziness 
are the prototype model of representation (e.g., Rosch & Mervis, 1975) and the 
exemplar model of representation (Smith & Medin, 1981). The prototype model 
is based on similarity matching where instances are evaluated against a prototype, 
or theoretical ideal. Close approximation to the prototype yields categorization of 
instances as central to the concept. Progressively weaker approximation to the proto- 
type produces more peripheral categorization of included members. In the domain 
of natural categories, robins and sparrows are judged more similar to the ideal pro- 
totype “bird” than are penguins and turkeys, which would be considered peripheral 
members of the category “bird” because of their poorer approximation of the ideal 
or prototypical bird. 
The exemplar model of categorization differs from the prototype model in that 
it recognizes explicitly that there can be many ways to approximate a category ideal. 
Therefore, an exemplar-based categorization procedure entails multiple concrete ex- 
amples for comparative purposes in determining category membership. Categori- 
zers, in the exemplar model, would retrieve many good examples of birds (e.g., 
robins, sparrows, bluejays, canaries), and compare the target instance with these 
multiple examples rather than with a single idealized prototype. In this latter model, 
category inclusion occurs if the instance matches at least one of the retrieved 
examples. 
Cantor has used both protoytpe and exemplar representations for application 
to clinical diagnosis. For example, Cantor and Genero (in press) concluded that 
summary prototypes may be most useful for novices in grasping the fuzzy struc- 
ture of diagnostic categories. In contrast, experts appear to distinguish typical from 
atypical cases with greater confidence using an exemplar model. Procedures are 
also provided for distinguishing different categories from each other. 
The act frequency approach to clinical assessment accords well at several junc- 
tures with Cantor’s natural categorization approach. First, the approaches are in 
agreement about the intrinsic fuzziness of natural and psychiatric categories. Clinical 
membership is continuous rather than discrete, and categories show feature overlap. 
Second, within both approaches, there are alternative paths to reaching the same 
diagnosis. Within Cantor’s approach, alternative combinations of features can pro- 
duce similar diagnoses. Within the act frequency approach, different combinations 
of act trends of diagnostically-relevant dispositions, as well as different act portraits, 
can yield similar diagnostic classification. 
Finally, the procedures developed by Cantor and Genero (in press) for similarity- 
matching can be employed within the act frequency approach. Act portraits derived 
in various ways by the procedures described earlier can be employed in the Cantor- 
Genero similarity matching paradigm. These procedures in combination can be 
expected to clarify the thorny issues of syndrome overlap and diagnostic differen- 
tiation. 
Relation to Behavioral Assessment 
Although behavioral assessment carries different meanings for different investigators 
and practitioners, several core features can be extracted and compared with the 
act frequency approach (Goldfreid & Kent, 1972; Hartmann, Roper, & Bradford, 
1979; Mash, 1979). Both approaches focus on what the person does, both emphasize 
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the study of behavior in natural contexts, and both treat specific behaviors as samples 
from designated domains. Beyond these similarities, the act frequency approach 
diverges from that of behavioral assessment on four key points. 
First, the two approaches differ in the nature of the categories of behavior that 
guide their research strategies. The act frequency approach begins with disposi- 
tional constructs drawn from everyday language, and treats them as cognitive 
categories of acts whose internal (e.g., prototypicality) structure and manifested 
( i.e., occurrence frequency) structure can be studied. In contrast, behavioral assess- 
ment focuses on categories of behavior relevant to situations that are problematic 
for clients in therapy. In addition, behavioral assessment categories often function 
as skill or ability constructs in the sense that the behaviors are typically evaluated 
against a standard of effectiveness in dealing with problematic situations. Because 
of these differences between the two approaches, behavioral assessment typically 
involves a detailed analysis of situation-specific behavioral descriptions. In contrast, 
the act frequency approach operates at the dispositional level by aggregating single 
acts into act trends or multiple-act indices (Buss & Craik, 1983a). 
A second major contrast between the two approaches centers around the issues 
of prediction and control. Behavioral assessment is often focused on monitoring 
behavioral change, and therefore tends to minimize temporal stability and predic- 
tion. The act frequency approach is explicitly concerned with documenting various 
forms of temporal stability (Buss, 1985b), particularly at the level of act trends or 
multiple-act indices. Thus, there is a greater emphasis on prediction and descrip- 
tion within the act frequency approach, while behavioral assessment emphasizes 
therapy interventions and the monitoring of behavioral change. 
A third important differentiating feature centers around the presumed causes 
of behavior. Behavioral assessment typically locates the causes of behavior in main- 
taining conditions within the current environment. In contrast, the key constructs 
within the act frequency approach - dispositions - are viewed as performing descrip- 
tiue rather than explanatory functions regarding specific behaviors. Thus, the iden- 
tification of causal factors for individual differences in act trends is viewed as an 
open issue, and can encompass both organismic and environmental agents. 
Finally, behavioral assessment is primarily idiographic in application. Unique 
behaviors of specific individuals are targeted for assessment and intervention. In 
contrast, the act frequency approach tends to be more nomothetic, although it can 
be deployed for idiographic analysis as well (Buss & Craik, 1983c, 1984). 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The act frequency approach to the psychopathology of everyday conduct carries 
several important implications. They include the conceptual analysis of personali- 
ty disorders, implications for clinical assessment techniques for each disorder, and 
the course by which conduct in everyday life eventually may lead to psychiatric 
diagnosis in more formal settings. This section briefly considers these issues. 
The act frequency approach to the DSM-III personality disorders highlights the 
important role of everyday conduct in understanding each syndrome. While the 
DSM-III provides dispositional descriptions of each disorder, identifying of the act 
manifestations subsumed by these dispositions (singly and in conjunction), and by 
the syndromes themselves, remains a central research task. Unpacking the act 
manifestations of each syndrome can be expected to clarify conceptual issues such 
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as diagnostic differentiation, as well as illustrating the rich diversity of acts that 
may be subsumed by each syndrome considered alone. This report is a first effort 
at exploring the usefulness of the act frequency approach for our understanding 
of psychiatric diagnosis and personality disorders. 
Two strategies have been described for identifying clinically relevant dispositions 
that are encoded in everyday language. In the first strategy, the entire array of major 
trait terms is scanned for psychiatric pertinence through the use of expert clinical 
judgment. In the second strategy, the most salient dispositional terms for each of 
the 1 I personality disorder syndromes of the DSM-III are identified. Together, 
these two strategies establish a meaningful sub-set of dispositional terms relevant 
to clinical assessment and available for act prototypicality analysis. 
The third strategy adopts the syndrome itself as an additional level of analysis 
and explores the relations among syndromes, the dispositions they subsume, and 
the act manifestations of syndromes, both directly and through their salient disposi- 
tions (see Figure 1). We suggest empirical procedures for linking these three levels 
of analysis, and for testing alternative act portraits for their goodness-of-fit to each 
syndrome. 
Because clinical assessment often occurs in settings removed from ordinary life, 
our strategy provides methods for translating diagnostic classifications back to their 
original referents in everyday conduct. Thus, the act frequency approach views 
dispositions as categories of acts whose internal and manifested structures can be 
explored. We anticipate that these methods of unpacking the everyday referents 
for diagnostic categories and their subsumed dispositions will yield hundreds or 
thousands of acts that directly illuminate the psychopathology of everyday conduct. 
One possible outcome of these analyses is that many of the acts generated directly 
from syndrome-derived dispositions will not themselves be judged to be clinically 
relevant. The dispositional term “dependent ,” for example, may be judged rele- 
vant to the histrionic personality disorder. But only a subset of prototypically depend- 
ent acts may be directly relevant to the histrionic syndrome, or in any other way 
clinically pertinent. Perhaps combinations of dependent acts with acts prototypical 
of other histrionic-relevant dispositions (e.g., self-dramatizing) may be judged more 
pertinent to histrionic personality disorder than prototypically dependent acts in 
isolation. In addition, base-rate considerations may be relevant to diagnosis, with 
high frequencies of dependent acts needed before classification in the histrionic 
category is warranted. The act frequency approach provides a means for examin- 
ing how patterns of everyday conduct combine as portraits of a particular personality 
disorder. 
Specific personality disorder syndromes can be conceptually clarified by their 
translation into act portraits drawn from the context of everyday action. These act 
portraits can be used to illuminate the nature of each syndrome, and to gauge the 
overlap and distinctiveness of each of the 11 DSM-III personality disorders. Multiple 
act sorting procedures offer a means for determining which syndromes share few 
or many prototypical dispositions and acts. The structural relations among the syn- 
dromes can be determined by these procedures. The structural relations also can 
be examined for potential mapping onto the structure of interpersonal dispositions, 
as Widiger and his colleagues advocate (Widiger & Frances, in press; Widiger i? 
Kelso, 1983). 
The relations between dispositional terms in ordinary language and the formal 
psychiatric classifications of personality disorders warrant some final observations. 
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The theoretical orientation of the act frequency approach leads us to our present 
focus -viewing dispositional constructs as intermediary between syndromes and 
pertinent acts (see Figure 1). The success of translating syndromes into disposi- 
tions and then into acts, however, remains an empirical challenge. Our assump- 
tion is that the translation will be adequate and the opportunity for discovering new 
and unanticipated facets of the personality disorders will more than justify this effort. 
Our analysis highlights several important differences between dispositional terms 
and the psychiatric categories of personality disorders. They differ in their origins, 
explicitness, and structure. We have speculated elsewhere (Buss & Craik, 1983a) 
about the mysterious origins of dispositional constructs, viewing them as emergents 
of socio-cultural evolution. In contrast, the history of psychiatric diagnosis is well 
documented (American Psychiatric Association, 1980; Millon, 1981). Second, usage 
of dispositional terms in ordinary language is subject to indigenous cultural change 
and variation;_in contrast, the psychiatric classifications are codified, changes are 
subject to expert balloting, and specific training in usage is conducted. Finally, within 
our framework, dispositional constructs are viewed as categories of one kind of 
element-the act. Personality disorder syndromes appear to be more heterogeneous 
categories, entailing acts, dispositions, inferred cognitive states, appearance, de- 
meanor, institutional outcomes such as expulsion from school, and other components. 
Interestingly, many of the key designating terms for the 11 personality disorders, 
such as paranoid, narcissistic, and histrionic, appear as trait-descriptive terms in 
ordinary language (see Allport & Odbert, 1936). Thus, a case can be made for the 
primacy of dispositional constructs, and for the view that at least some of the 
psychiatric categories for the personality disorders represent expert embellishments 
of them. 
Finally, we note that the present articulation of the act frequency approach in 
the context of psychiatric classification is not limited to the DSM-III personality 
syndromes. The same procedures can be extended to other typological systems such 
as Shapiro’s (1965) neurotic styles, or the Jungian system of types (Jung, 1923). 
Most importantly, it provides a method for tying any psychiatric classification system 
directly to the psychopathology of everyday conduct. 
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